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LAUGHTER IN NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT:
A PHILOSOPHICAL TRAGICOMEDY
LAWRENCEJ. HATAB
T0 laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out 0/ tbe wbole trutb - to
do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for the truth, and the most gifted had
too linIe genius for that. Even laughter may yet have a future. l
Laughter is an important image in Nietzsche's writings; it is even expressed
as the consummate goal to which he is calling his readers. In this essay, I would
like to address three questions: 1) What is the meaning oflaughter in Nietzsche's
thought? 2) How does that meaning help us understand the meaning oflaughter
in general? 3) What can the issue of laughter tell us about Nietzsche's style?
Questions 1 and 3 have been treated before. 2 I only want to add to the discus-
sion and focus it in a particular way. Regarding question 2, I do not intend
to offer a "theory" oflaughter (the typical post-Wittgensteinian cop-out). lonly
want to suggest ways in which Nietzsche's thought can help illuminate the mean-
ing of laughter in some important ways.
Laughter, for Nietzsche, is far from an incidental matter; it is a fundamen-
tal issue in his view of the world. I want to address the meaning of laughter
by linking it to another central issue in Nietzsche's thought, namely the tragic.
When we consider the drama of Zarathustra, we witness a surprising mixture
of images and attitudes: a confrontation with the terror of existence and many
terrible thoughts, fierce attacks on traditional beliefs, playful parodies and a call
for joy and laughter in response to the terror oflife. Indeed, this mixture is found
in all of Nietzsche's writings. One clue to the sense of such a combination of
attitudes is to be found in the Greek experience of tragedy and comedy.
Nietzsche's analysis of Greek tragedy and its importance for his thought are weIl
known. His remarks on Greek comedy are not as extensive. But a considera-
tion of the relationship between comedy and tragedy in Greek culture will show
that Nietzsche's call for laughter is related to the tragic in a comparable way.
The key to this relationship is as folIows: Both the tragic and the comic
are situations which show a negation of "being." For the Greeks, tragedy and
comedy expressed a two-sided affirmative response to negation, limits and
finitude. Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming inherits this mixture, and calls for
laughter as an expression of, and an affirmative response to, the negation of
"being." After this analysis has been worked out, I will then suggest ways in
which the "negation" thesis can apply to an interpretation of laughter in general.
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Finally, I will offer some remarks on how the lssue of laughter relates to
Nietzsche's style.
I. Nietzschean Laughter in Relation to Tragedy and Comedy
The tragic and the comic are two fundamental existential conditions. The
tragic is a situation in which the inevitable finitude of existence, the destruction
of life and meaning, is displayed. The human response to the tragic might in-
volve terror, dread, a solemn awe, or tears. The comic is a situation in which
the humorous side of existence is displayed, with a response of delight, joy and
laughter. Normally we think that these two conditions are opposites, that the
tragic is 1) a negative situation, involving 2) a negative state of mind, and that
the comic is 3) a positive situation, involving 4) a positive state of mind. In my
view, points 1 and 4 are surely correct, but points 2 and 3 are misleading. The
tragic situation need not involve a negative state of mind, and so it might show
a link with the comic state of mind. The comic also involves a kind of negation,
and so it might show a link with the tragic situation. There is an ambiguity
in the tragic-comic distinction which undermines a strict opposition between
the terms, and which helps explain the importance of laughter in the tragic
philosophy of Nietzsche.
I want to argue that both the tragic and the comic involve negation, and
the peculiarly human phenomena of crying and laughing both arise from human
awareness of negation and limits. If, in this way, a certain relationship between
the tragic and the comic can he estahlished, then we may hetter understand
why a clear boundary line hetween the two is often difficult to draw.
I also want to argue that the intersection of the tragic and the comic not
only illuminates the meaning of laughter in Nietzsche, but it might also repre-
sent the single most important element in Nietzsche's overall thought. The tragic-
comic relationship is clearly significant in Nietzsche's writings, but it seems to
have been avoided or gone unnoticed in many interpretations.
Nietzsche's philosophy presents two basic challenges: 1) An existential con-
frontation with the terror of existence (the priority ofbecoming and a continual
negation of"being'). 2) An intellectual confrontation with the limits ofknowledge
(perspectives and appearances as opposed to an abiding "truth"). But in response
to this tragic condition, Nietzsche recommends a special kind of joy and laughter
as the only alternative to a pessimistic denial of existence, or to an optimistic
fantasy that negation and limits can somehow be resolved. In Nietzsche's eyes,
the tragic and the comic are two sides of the same coin, two ways in which
negation can be acknowledged and affirmed. The world as a tragedy and the
world as a comedy are two images that are predominant in Nietzsche's writings.
Neither one is meant to be an opposite of the other. In fact, comedy and laughter
can emerge as a particular positive response to the tragic, without, however,
denying the negativity of the tragic. In other words, comedy, for Nietzsche,
becomes a special way in which a tragic situation need not involve a negative
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,state of mind. In order to understand this point, we must turn to an historical
precedent, namely the Greek experience of tragedy and comedy, which, seen
in the light of Nietzsche's interpretation of early Greek culture, shows itself to
be something other than polarized.
One reason why Greek tragedy and comedy were not opposites is that both
can be traced to a common religious complex, the Dionysian. Nietzsche, of
course, is noted for his analysis ofAttic tragedy in terms of the link with Diony-
sian religion. I will only mention the essential features of that analysis here,
and then develop a related analysis of comedy.
The worship of Dionysus involved an ecstatic self-transcendence, where the
boundaries of form were shattered and immersion in the natural flow of destruc-
tion was given a sacred meaning. The Dionysian mythos of a god suffering
dismemberment, death and rebirth was cultivated in rituals so that sheer negativi-
ty could be transformed into a cultural meaning and worshippers could experience
a sense of harmony and redemption through self-negation. Although nature
destroys the individual, the whole of nature was seen to be indestructible and
sacred. Thus, Dionysian self-transcendence (as opposed to self-containment)
granted religious integration. According to Nietzsche, the fatalistic themes of
Attic tragedy, where the hero is doomed to inevitable destruction, expressed
a Dionysian insight. However, the Apollonian element ofGreek tragedy added
beauty and form to express those themes with rich characterizations and struc-
ture. Apollonian art forms delighted the viewer, but at the same time they por-
trayed a dark Dionysian theme. In tragedy, even though the ultimate truth is
Dionysian destruction, Apollonian "appearances" offered individuation and beau-
ty so that man could find temporary meaning in the midst of a terrible truth.
According to Nietzsche, the following world view could be inferred from
Greek tragedy: individuation and form allow life to be meaningful and beautiful;
but within individuation is a formless flux which persists as a continual destruc-
tion of form. The important point is that Greek tragedy was not a purely negative
phenomenon. Tragic poetry displayed two levels of affirmation: 1) the Apollo-
nian affirmation of beauty and noble forms; and 2) the Dionysian affirmation
of dissolution as justified destruction. The destruction of a noble hero is also the
advent of a sacred power. By emphasizing the religious dimension of tragedy,
Nietzsche was able to illuminate those positive aspects that distinguished the
Greek experience of tragedy from something like pessimism. Tragedy was more
likely to evoke joy than resignation among the Greeks (to the consternation
of someone like Schopenhauer).3
The positive aspects of Greek tragedy can be further understood if we con-
sider the Dionysian link between tragedy and comedy. Dionysian rites general-
ly took two basic forms: 1) joyful erotic feasts in which the conventional self
was lost in a surge of unrestrained sexual passion; and 2) somber rites in which
frenzied followers of the god would re-enact his mythos by dismembering and
devouring animal victims. Both rites were said to bring peace and blissful com-
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munion with the gode It is important to emphasize this positive element and
the fact that death and dismemberment represented only one side of Dionysus.
As a nature deity, he was also a god of life; he bestowed erotic passion which
promotes regeneration. One can notice, however, that eroticism displays an
analogous "dismemberment" of conventional behavior and everyday order in
the face of passion. In any case, joy and pleasure were just as much apart of
the Dionysian complex as natural destruction and death. Dionysian religion,
therefore, offered various subversions of form and conventional order; some were
somber and fatal, others playful and hedonistic.
In this regard, the meaning of comedy can be illuminated if we consider
an important Greek counterpart to the somber, violent rites, namely the komos,
which was also associated with Dionysian worship. The komos was a swarming
band of drunken men who engaged in dancing, laughter, witty and mocking
language, and who generally threw off all social conventions and inhibitions. 4
The komos permitted a more accessible and less severe form of Dionysian self-
transcendence, a more frolicsome form of"ecstasy," in which social conventions
were subjected to Dionysian "dismemberment." The etymological connection
with comedy can be found in the Greek word komodia, "song of the komos." A
more substantial connection should then be apparent. The religious phenomenon
of disinhibiting revelry, and the mocking attacks against authority figures that
were socially permitted during such celebrations, can easily be seen as a forerun-
ner of comic drama. r
The two-dimensional character of Dionysian religion shows a common
background for the dramatic forms of tragedy and comedy. On the one hand,
the somber ecstasy of the violent rites promoted participation in the actual
destruction of life, and hence reflected the fatal process of nature in which in-
dividuallife and form are subjected to an annihilating force. Here we recognize
the conditions of tragedy. On the other hand, the frolicsome ecstasy of the erotic
feasts and the komos promoted a disinhibiting revelry which offered a relatively
harmless destruction of social and cultural roles by means of mockery and the
temporary subversion of convention and authority. Here we recognize the con-
ditions of comedy. Both types can be said to display in different ways a com-
mon Dionysian insight: form (whether natural or cultural) is not substantial,
and a sacred meaning can be found in the innihilating power ofDionysian ecstasy,
which shatters a fixation on form.
We notice behind tragedy and comedy, therefore, two forms ofDionysian
negation, one more severe, the other more playful and harmless. The element
of negation gives a clue concerning the relation between tragedy and comedy,
pathos and humor. Comedic negation is more a social matter; it can annihilate
a pose or a convention (e.g., mockery, satire); it is temporary and relatively
harmless; it evokes laughter. Tragic negation is a more vital and fatal matter,
the annihilation of life or a complete cultural downfall. In the Greek context,
both forms of negation were related and expressive of a religious insight: con-
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Ivention and individuallife are not what they seem to be; if one acknowledges
the disruptive negation ofculture and life, one can receive the blessings of humor
and pathos, both of which teach about the necessary limits of form.
Greek tragedy and comedy, therefore, show a certain relationship and a
positive religious background. In fact, the Dionysian relationship suggests that
the "positive" features of comedy might not be unrelated to the intentions of
tragedy. Humor might be a special way in which pathos can lead to Dionysian
joy. Indeed, the early history of Greek drama lends credence to this suggestion.
Although tragedy and comedy did become two separate art forms in Greek
theater, a certain comedic element was associated with tragedy in the form of
the satyr play. Early on, tragic performances took the form of a tetralogy, a
series of three works followed by a satyr play, in which traditional legends or
the heroes and gods from the tragedy were mocked or parodied (cf. "satire").
The satyr was a Dionysian figure, half-man half-beast, given to obscenity and
burlesque, thereby expressing the erotic, playful side of Dionysian worship. In
the satyr play, aside from a kind of comic relief, we should recognize the sacred
meaning of such a comedic epilogue. Joy, eroticism and renewal were just as
much apart of Dionysian worship as fatal destruction. Embracing the god was
meant to produce an affirmative response in the midst of negation. The satyr
could be seen as an effective way of expressing the rebirth of the god, by trans-
forming the solemn destnlction of the hero into the joyous recognition of a sacred
force underlying that destruction. Such a process might be called a double
negative leading to a positive, i.e., a satirical negation of the solemnity of tragic
negation. Humor is therefore one way of transforming and disarming terror.
Nietzsche noticed this and expressed the relationship between tragedy and com-
edy in the following way:
Here, when the danger to his will is greatest, an approaches as a saving sorceress, expert
at healing. She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurd-
ity of existence into notions with which one can live: these are the sublime as the artistic
taming of the horrible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of absurdity.
The satyr chorus of the dithyramb is the saving deed of Greek art; faced with the intennediary
world of these Dionysian companions, the feelings described here exhausted themselves. 6
Because the satyr plays were later dissociated from tragic trilogies, any rela-
tion between tragedy and comedy and any positive elements of tragedy could
easily fade from view. But even Aristotle surmised that the solemn form oftragedy
was a progression from an earlier (and to him, ludicrous) satyric form. 7 In any
event, the Dionysian link between tragedy and comedy could be the telling clue
to Plato's suggestion that "the same man might be capable of writing both com-
edy and tragedy-that the tragic poet might be a comedian as well."8 In my
view, Nietzsche wanted to be that "same man."
The key to Nietzsche's interest in tragedy and comedy is an overlapping
element in which forms ofbeing are subjected to negation. The response to nega-
tion, would involve a recognition of a limit to forms of being. The tragic-comic
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recognition of limits was a distinctive feature of Greek religion. Consider, for
example, the curious phenomenon of divine laughter. 9 Especially in Homer,
we find that the gods laugh at humans and at themselves, surely a remarkable
thing compared to the "seriousness" of the major world religions. But divine
laughter expressed the peculiar Greek sense of limits, and was thereby related
to the tragic. Humans, though kin to the gods, were distinguished from the gods
by their mortality and the degree of their powerlessness. Gods, too, had limita-
tions on their power. Whenever gods or humans tried to overstep their power,
they appeared comical and were subjected to laughter. But only humans were
mortal, and the death of a hero would prompt even a god to weep. What
Nietzsche appreciated in Dionysian religion was a kind of synthesis of these two
senses of limit, and also the kind of joy in the midst ofnegative limits that tragedy
and comedy were able to evoke.
If tragedy and comedy can each be called an affirmative response to negative
limits, it would not be surprising that a boundary line between them is often
hard to draw. One possible distinction is that between harmful negation (oflife
alld meaning) and harmless negation (of conventional order and social poses),
evoking, respectively, pathos and laughter. But it is also possible for humans
to laugh when suffering terrible and tragic situations. Surely this is not a com-
mon thing, but it happens, and such laughter would be quite different from the
kind in jokes, satire, etc. But tragic laughter would at least be analogous to com-
ic laughter in the sense that a laugh is an affirmative response to a limit. This
special kind of laughter was one of Nietzsche's preoccupations. Such, I think,
is the meaning of the shepherd scene in Zarathustra. The shepherd appears after
the tragic doctrine of eternal recurrence is described. He is writhing in pain
and nausea because a black snake has lodged inside his throat. But then he bites
off the head of the snake.
No longer shepherd, no longer human - one changed, radiant, laugbing! Never yet on earth
has a human being laughed as he laughed! 0 my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no
human laughter; and now a thirst gnaws at me, a longing that never grows still. My longing
for this laughter gnaws at me. 10
I would say that, for Nietzsche, laughter is, among other things, a most
positive form of tragic affirmation, an affirmative appropriation of the negative
limits of "being." Here he saw himself inheriting the cheerful fatalism of the
Greeks:
... the short tragedy always gave way again and returned into the eternal comedy of ex-
istence; and "the waves ofuncountable laughter"-to eite Aeschylus-must in the end over-
whelm even the greatest of these tragedians. 11
II. The Meaning of Laughter
Can the previous discussion add anything to an analysis of the meaning of
laughter in general? I think so. Let me mention three classic types of theories
concerning humor and laughter: 12 1) superiority theories (e.g., tearing down by
LAUGHTER IN NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT 73
mockery and satire; cf. Hobbes); 2) incongruity theories (e.g., absurdity, and
the contradiction of an expected order, regularity or normality; cf. Kant); 3)
relief theories (e.g., relief from social restraints, especially in sexual humor; cf.
Freud). Each of these theories, alone, would not be sufficient, and one can think
of examples in which the three types overlap. I do not claim to offer an ex-
haustive counter-theory to these types, but I would say that the issue of nega-
tion and limits can help illuminate 1) a common element in many forms of
laughter, and 2) ways in which these forms often overlap.
Laughter reflects the enjoyment ofsomething. I would suggest that laughter
enjoys various situations in which a fIXed form has been negated and shown
its limits. Mockery and satire negate a certain pose; incongruities negate a cer-
tain expected order; and relief negates a certain social restraint. Moreover, these
conditions often overlap: mockery and satire need not only evoke superiority
feelings, they may simply follow from enjoying the incongruity of the ruined
pose, and offer a kind of relief from the control of the pose; and absurdity, for
example, may be a mockery of, and a relieffrom, logic. We notice here various
overlapping forms ofharmless negation, which show the limits ofa certain con-
struct.
In addition, there is something not quite covered in the above three theories,
namely laughing at oneself, which could be said to collect and internalize satire,
incongruity and relief, i.e., to enjoy one's own negation and limits in a social
context. This, I think, best illuminates the meaning of a sense of humor about
oneself, in contrast to a kind of "seriousness." People who are overly serious
about roles, beliefs or causes seem fIXated. The ability to laugh at oneself shows
a freedom from fIXation and affirms a willingness to sacrifice form-ality; it over-
comes what Nietzsehe called the spirit ofgravity and is able to enjoy a surrender
ofstructure; it acknowledges a kind ofuncertainty about oneself and one's bellefs
in a special way.
The negation thesis can also speak to forms of laughter in tragic or harmful
situations, which are not apparently considered by other theories. Consider some-
one who can laugh at his own terrible downfall. Here, limits, mockery, incongrui-
ty and relief might find an unusual form and an unusual form of laughter.
To sum up this seetion, I am not sure "why" we laugh, but wben we laugh,
that response reveals something special in our nature: the peculiarly human ability
to appropriate negation and limits in a positive way. In the laugh, something
deep and instinctive in human nature acknowledges and affirms the disman-
tling of structure and "being."
It is no wonder, then, that Nietzsehe, the advocate of becoming, would
find Iaughter so important: "Laughing at something is the first sign of a higher
psychic life."13 The obvious point would be Iaughter's dissolving effect on fIXa-
tion. We began this essay with a quote which connected laughter with a "suffi-
cient sense for the truth." We can say now that the "truth" revealed in a laugh
is the shanering of a fIXed truth. Nietzsche's call for laughter is related to his
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attack on truth and foundations in western thought. The "seriousness" ofwestern
philosophy and religion reveals its struggle for, and fIXation on, truth and cer-
tainty in a world ofbecoming. Truth and salvation have been no laughing mat-
ter; the western tradition displays something like the scolding of children, by
insisting that there be "something at which it is absolutely forbidden henceforth
to laugh."14 Nietzschean laughter is a call to abandon truth and certainty and
to embrace the limits of knowledge and life. Nietzsche calls on us to abandon
our certainties in a good-natured way. Laughter would apply here as in other
situations where the negation of form is enjoyed. Moreover, when it comes to
confronting instances ofphilosophical seriousness, humor would be an appropriate
form of "criticism." That brings us to Nietzsche's style.
111. Laughter and Nietzsche's Style
Nietzsche is funny. There are times when I laugh out loud at some of the
things he says. I cannot say the same for other great philosophers. (Forgive me
if I have missed someone, but for me, they all weigh a ton, even Kierkegaard.)
Of course, Nietzsche's wit and biting style are obvious. And we all know that
he is one philosopher for whom style and substance go together. His aphoristic
style is related to his critique of traditional philosophical methods. His narrative
style in Zaratbustra is related to his existential assumptions. In view of the
arguments in this essay, we can further say that Nietzsche's humorous style is
also related to his critique of traditional philosophical attitudes. In other words,
Nietzsche's humor is not accidental or incidental to his message.
But the interesting question is: When is Nietzsche being humorous? As I
said, his wit is obvious. But I would like to suggest that some of the more
outrageous and seemingly dangerous things Nietzsche says, which we lovers of
Nietzsche either avoid or reject or feel bound to "decode," might themselves
be forms of humor. Moreover, some of the things we lovers of Nietzsche are
very serious about might themselves be parodied at times in his writings.
When, and to what extent, is Nietzsche offering parodies, in which certain
mistakes are meant to receive a "laughter which makes the required correc-
tions"? 15 A precise answer to such a question is impossible. One can, however,
say the following: Nietzsche makes enough references to laughter and parody
to warrant the suggestion that readers should often keep the humor option in
mind when faced with certain Nietzschean "excesses" and even "profundities."
Indeed, I am not the first to say this; I only want to rehearse the point and
keep it alive. Perhaps the way I have shaped the issue of laughter in this essay
will help in that regard. With this in mind, let me offer a few remarks in the
context of some textual references:
... we are the first age that has truly studied "costumes" - I mean those of moraliries, ar-
rides of faith, tastes in the arts, and religions - prepared like no previous age for a carnival
in the grand style, for the laughter and high spirits of the most spiritual revelry, for the
transcendental heights of the highest nonsense and_~~~~~~~~~~~~_e~~~~~~!_t!t~_~9!'td-" _
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Perhaps this is where we shall still discover the realm of our invention, that realm in which
we, too, can still be original, say, as parodists ofworld history and God's buffoons-perhaps,
even if nothing else today has any future, our laugbter may yet have a future.t 6
In despite of that philospher who, being areal Englishman, tried to bring laughter into ill
repute among all thinking men - "laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every
thinking mind will strive to overcome" (Hobbes) - I should actually risk an order of rank
among philosophers depending on the rank oftheir laughter-all the way up to those capable
of golden laughter. 17
When Nietzsche talks about laughter, how much of that is a warning and
a clue about certain aspects of his writings? Again, a precise answer to this ques-
tion cannot be given. But this much is true: Nietzsche wants us to laugh, and
it is certainly possible that much of the bombast in his writings is playful and
humorous. Consider N~etzsche's blistering attacks on Christianity and motality.
He certainly has a serious agenda here. But we philosophers emphasize the agenda
and engage his "argument." When it comes to some of his excessive, explosive
remarks, we either decode them, nervously avoid them, or simply apologize for
an over-heated hero. In any case, for us, the philosophical agenda takes priori-
ty, and the fearsome persona that leaps out of the pages is subordinated to that
agenda. But perhaps that persona is part of Nietzsche's "argument."
Often students have complained about a bristling passage, and I have said:
"Yes, I agree. I don't like it either. But let's try to put it in context." Then I
excavate, and conclude that the point is somewhere else, that he did not have
to say what he said in the passage. But the better student would ask: "Why
did he say it, then?" In researching this essay, I have become convinced that
one way we can answer that question, and support our conviction that Nietzsche
is "safe," is the humor option.
Yes, there is an outrageous bashing ofChristianity and morality in Nietzsche's
writings. But there are also many references which show support for, and ap-
preciation of, the religious and moral views he attacks. Perhaps some of his ex-
cesses are a kind ofblack comedy, meant to shock in a playful way. Moreover,
if comedy and laughter represent a kind ofharmless negation, then humor would
be one way in which Nietzsche could criticize without "refuting," something
his "perspectivism" would not permit him to do in any case. In this way, a
humorous style would be very much apart ofNietzsche's philosophical agenda,
and an important reminder concerning the intent of his critiques.
It is sometimes said that Nietzsche deliberately shocks his readers in order
to scare off the timid. Strong minds will endure the shock and be able to dig
beneath the surface and unearth the precious gems ofNietzsche's thought. Fine,
but what is meant by "strength" here? The idea has always made me nervous.
Are Nietzschean "shocks" a kind of philosophical boot camp for fierce minds,
or a test for a sense of humor about serious things? Perhaps true strength of
mind would have to entail a sense of humor.
Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravityp8
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Is Nietzsche's demonic assault against Christianity, for example, entirely serious?
Do you want to know a new name for me? The language of the church has one - I am ...
the Antichrist. Let us not forget how to laugh! 19
Nietzsche's attacks could easily involv~ the harmless negation of humor, given
his claim that:
· .. attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish
by associating my name with that of a cause or a person: pro or con-that makes no dif-
ference to me at this point. When I wage war against Christianity I am entitled to this because
I have never experienced misfonunes and frustrations from that quarter-the most serious
Christians have always been weIl disposed toward me. 20
Was Zarathustra's "ape," who on the surface sounded very much like
Nietzsche's fearsome persona, rep\Jdiated hecause, among other things, he was
overly serious?21 Is Zarathustra's ape a parody of that fearsome persona? Nietzsche
even hints that Zaratbustra itself is a parody.22 It is surely a parody of religion
and prophetic revelation. But there are also elements ofself-parody, which would
indicate a warning against taking Zarathustra's message too seriously and doing
wrong with Zarathustra's thoughts (cf. the ape), or erecting a new edifice to
replace the old.
· . . I want no "believers"; I think I am too malicious to believe in myself; I never speak
to masses. - I have a terrible fear that one day I will be pronounced holy: you will guess
why I publish this book bejOre; it shall prevent people from doing mischief with me.
I do not want to be a holy man; sooner even a buffoon. - Perhaps I am a buffoon. - Yet
in spite of that- or rather not in spite of it, because so far nobody has been more mendacious
than holy men-the truth speaks out of me.-But my truth is terrible. 23
Once again, we hear of the connection hetween humor and a terrihle truth.
I have tried to show how this tragic-comic connection might guide us in a reading
ofNietzsche, from the standpoint ofhoth style and suhstance. There is laughter
in hoth the medium and the message.
You higher men, . . . learn to laugh away over yourselves! Lift up your hearts, you good
dancer, high, higher! And do not forget good laughter. This crown ofhim who laughs, this
rose-wreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced
holy; you higher men, learn to laugh!24
Of course, Nietzsehe was a serious thinker who dealt with serious issues.
But the way in which Nietzsche expressed these issues distinguishes him from
other philosophers; and that way cannot he separated from the suhstance of
his thought. Humor should he seen as a Nietzschean retrieval of a Dionysian
insight ahout tragic limits in existence.
· .. I estimate the value of men, of races, according to the necessity by which they cannot
conceive the god apart from the satyr. 2f
Laughter would then he part of wisdom; it would not he contrary to serious
issues, hut rather a significant overture or finale to these issues as Nietzsche saw
them.
LAUGHTER IN NIETZSCHE'S THOUGHT 77
. . . the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and benevolence that will often appear
inbuman-for example, when it confronts all earthly seriousness so far, all solemnity in gesture,
word, tone, eye, morality, and task so far, as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary
parody - and in spite of all this, it is perhaps only with hirn that great seriousness really begins,
that the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul changes,
the hand moves forward, the tragedy begins. 26
... For cheerfulness-or in my own language gay science-is areward: the reward of a long,
brave, industrious, and subterranean seriousness, of which, to be sure, not everyone is capable.
But on the day we can say with all our hearts, "Onwards! our old morality too is part 0/
tbe comedy!" we shall have discovered a new complication and possibility for the Dionysian
drama of "The Destiny of the Soul" - and one can wager that the grand old eternal comic
poet of our existence will be quick to make use of it!27
And we should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh.28
I once had a student in a Nietzsche seminar who had read a lot ofNietzsche
before the course. At the end of the term, he came to me and said that the
course was a thrilling revelation of the philosophical importance of Nietzsche's
thought (oh, good!), but nowhere near as enjoyable as his first reading. I had
taught hirn how to make sense out ofNietzsche's writings, but I had taken some
of the fun out of it, for hirn. My ambivalence at that remark was really the
inspiration for this essay. As philosophers and teachers ofNietzsche, are we not
trapped in a kind of tragicomedy? We surely must make sense of Nietzsche's
writings and fit hirn into a philosophical agenda. He was a great thinker, and
we in Europe and America have done a great service in demonstrating that fact
and in weeding out the many misinterpretations, both silly and terrible. We
have had to decode, modify, explicate, excavate, reconstruct, deconstruct,
analyze, synthesize, push, pull and drag out the "argument," the sense of it alle
We have done this. But why didn't Nietzsehe do what we do? Why didn't he
save us some of the trouble? Is this OUT problem, not his? Somehow it has been
determined that a "philosopher" cannot write in a manner such as Nietzsche's.
He was electric, elusive and excessive; we must be cool, controlled and discursive.
Wehave made Nietzsche respectable and placed hirn within the profes-
sional philosophieal landscape. We have deciphered his epistemology, his
aesthetics, his ethies, his politics, his psyehology and, 10 and behold, his
metaphysies. Wehave discovered Nietzsehe the pragmatist, the existentialist,
the linguistic analyst, the post-Kantian, the pre-Heideggerian. We have done
this, and, I hasten to add, well we should. It is essential that Nietzsehe's
philosophieal importance and relevance be disclosed. That could easily not oe-
cur if Nietzsehe's manner of writing were not interpreted by us professionals.
But deep in our hearts, we also recognize, and this essay has tried to emphasize,
that Nietzsche's manner of writing was not an aeeident; it was very much apart
of his message. Therein lies our own peculiar "tragic" dilemma: When we
"translate" Nietzsche into our professional philosophical agenda, we do what
must be done, but in so doing, we bring to ruin something special and vital,
something equally necessary, equally "true." It seems we must "murder to dissect."
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Among philosophical commentators, our unique problem is that none of our
writing is even remotely like the subject of our writing- Nietzsche's writing.
Therein, too, lies a comedy. I have to say that once in a while, when I
read my own work or when I hear a skillful, serious exposition at a conference
on Nietzsche's thought, some of Nietzsche's own words come to me and the
contrast is comical. I imagine Nietzsche somewhere howling with laughter. This,
our dilemma, is a benevolent one, but a dilemma nevertheless, one which often
makes me feel like the Emperor with no clothes.
Philosophers want the truth. Even we lovers of Nietzsche want the truth
about Nietzsche's critique of truth. Nietzsche, however, was surely consistent
in his critique of truth when he was able to use parody and humor in reference
to his own enterprise. Of course, we would not get published or get tenure or
get promoted if we did that. But I wish that just once we could turn an APA
convention over to Monty Python. Punchline: How would we know the dif-
ference?
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